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Abstract
Aggregate computing is a paradigm that tries to fully escape the single device
abstraction. It handles collective behaviour and interactions between devices
for developers.
Thanks to field calculus, aggregate programming can deal with mobile de-
vices deployed in physical space - situated. Every device can move and
change position deliberately.
Nowadays aggregate programming does not consider security threads, i.e. a
malevolent device that sends corrupted or unexpected data. This is a prob-
lem because such algorithms are, above all, deployed in critical systems where
human lives could be in danger. It is a priority to look at mitigation and
defense mechanisms.
This dissertation presents solutions and finally proposes ideas for new hybrid
approaches that use trust system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The essence of abstractions is preserving information that is rel-
evant in a given context, and forgetting information that is irrel-
evant in that context. – John V. Guttag
In a world of ubiquitous computing, technologies are almost everywhere:
bank transfert, communication services, transports and even medical equip-
ment. Devices are mobile and deployed in physical space, situated. Alto-
gether they create what in literature is often called pervasive continuum.
The medium is an amorphous computing medium, that (Abelson et al. 2000)
can be defined as:
a system of irregularly placed, asynchronous, locally interacting
computing elements.
Each unit belonging to the medium can i) be faulty: it is reasonable that
it may stop working, ii) be sensitive to the environment, iii) be able to
move itself around in space, iv) have computing power and a memory
system, v) be able to communicate with some neighbor units.
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1.1 Collective behavior 1. Introduction
Pervasive continuum, as every other shared coordination medium must deal
with users that could behave inadequately or even with malevolent intents.
Information security tries to protect them from illegal uses and threads fo-
cusing on confidentiality, integrity and availability of a given system.
For the reasons aforementioned, this work aims at introducing security-aware
mechanisms and studying possible solutions in current aggregate program-
ming paradigm. Experiments and solutions proposed focus to a gradient
algorithm that evaluate the distance from a source. The gradient is chosen
because it is recognised as exemplary model of the computational field.
A gradient algorithm is the de-facto standard example and the proposed
improvements can be adapted to other scenarios without too much effort.
Before starting with the dissertation, in the next section common properties
and definitions about collective behaviour follows.
1.1 Collective behavior
Dealing with collective devices’ behavior can be more natural and intelligible
rather than dealing with each single unit and his interactions with neighbors.
The basic application of collective behavior is wave propagation. Wave prop-
agation with hop count1 is evocative of the gradients formed by chemical
diffusion. Unit A spreads a value to his neighbors forming a chain reaction
between nodes. In botanic it is also known as growing points concept.
A growing point is an activity of a group of neighboring compu-
tational particles that can be propagated to an overlapping neigh-
borhood. Growing points can split, die off, or merge with other
1In computer networking, a hop is one portion of the path between source and desti-
nation.
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growing points. As a growing point passes through a neighbor-
hood, it may modify the states of the particles it visits. We can
interpret this state modification as the growing point laying down
a particular material as it passes. The growing point may be sen-
sitive to particular diffused messages, and in propagating itself,
it may exhibit a tropism toward or away from a source, or move
in a way that attempts to keep constant the “concentration” of
some diffused message. Particles representing particular materi-
als may “secrete” appropriate diffusible messages that attract or
repel specific growing points. - (Abelson et al. 2000)
The characteristics mentioned above recall what (Hewitt & Jong 1984) have
stated as properties of every open system:
1. Asynchronous communication for coordination.
2. Ability to deal with large quantities of diverse information.
3. Concurrent unplanned dynamics.
4. Decentralized control, local decisions should be made.
5. Possible inconsistency of information throughout time.
6. Each component needs to keep track only of its own state and how to
relate with neighbors.
7. Principle of locality:2 the effect of any event is local.
8. Reliability: failures of individual components should be irrelevant.
2In physics, the principle of locality states that an object is only directly influenced by
its immediate surroundings.
1.2 Summary of chapters 1. Introduction
Accordingly to (Beal & Bachrach 2006), abstraction layers between
single devices and the higher level aggregate system are:
• Global, higher level that controls the regions’3 behavior, also called
computational field (Beal & Viroli 2016);
• Local, amorphous coordination medium in which the behavior of each
node is specific;
• Discrete, a network of devices that exchange messages with their
neighborhoods.
Devices aggregation can be done through i) spatial and time coordination
or ii) network structure. Specific constructs dictate how data is exchanged
and manipulated across regions. Local operations and interactions allow
collaboration between individual computational devices.
1.2 Summary of chapters
The outline of the thesis is as follow. Chapter 2 gives a background on
aggregate programming, its paradigm, involved abstractions and properties.
Chapter 3 gives an overview about misbehaviours and the attacks that can
occur in aggregate computing systems and, more generally, in distributed
system. Chapter 4 gives a background on trust systems and a description
of two of the main algorithms, Eigentrust and Peertrust. Chapter 5 shows
the results of experiments in which attacks are simulated in various scenarios.
Chapter 6 proposes solutions to mitigate attacks investigated in the previ-
ous chapter such as i) using an external trust system, ii) developing filter
functions and iii) creating an embedded local trust system in each node.
3Aggregation of several computational units
Chapter 2
Aggregate Programming
Aggregate programming is a paradigm applied to design, create and maintain
complex distributed systems. The aim is to fill up all developers needs when
dealing with time, space and an enormous amount of devices interconnected.
Such systems are also called the pervasive continuum (Zambonelli et al. 2011)
for being:
• distributed,
• dense,
• mobile,1
• heterogeneous.
It is conform to the following principles useful for distributed programming
framework, mentioned by (Beal & Viroli 2016):
1. Have mechanisms for robust coordination under the hood.
2. Composing different modules and subsystems must be simple and
transparent.
1been able to be moved from one place to another
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2.1 Background 2. Aggregate Programming
3. Coordination mechanisms could be different between modules, regions
and times.
Aggregate programming is currently used in different domains such as wire-
less sensor networks, crowd safety (Beal et al. 2015), disaster relief op-
erations, construction of resilient enterprise systems and network security.
These fields have a common characteristic; they have computing devices
distributed throughout a physical space. For that reason aggregate
programming is always accompanied by the term spatial computing.
It can be also applied to networks that are not closely tied to space, such
as enterprise service networks for services recovery from failures (Clark et al.
2015).
Nevertheless, it is possible to exploit the aforementioned characteristics in
network security. Aggregate programming in network security is inspected
by (Paulos et al. 2013).
2.1 Background
Aggregate programming derives from Field Calculus, a core set of succinct-
ness constructs which models device behavior and interactions. Thanks to
his succinctness it is possible to do mathematical analysis on it. Neverthe-
less, the field calculus’s syntax and semantics are expressive enough to be
universal (Beal & Viroli 2016).
In physics, a field is a region in which each point (scalar) is affected by a
force (vector) (Britannica n.d.). In this work the terms region and field are
used interchangeably. A deeper formalization of field notion is described by
(McMullin 2002). In mathematics scalars and vectors are indeed quantities
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that are used to describe the motion of objects.
The word computational means “ability to compute” both of the device
by itself and in conjunction with other neighbor devices, exploiting local-to-
global interactions. Computation is a pure function over fields (see Figure
2.1): the conception of state is integrated in the one of time.
Figure 2.1: How to compute a channel using pure functions
The first computational field model was proposed by (Tokoro 1990). His
model aims to solve many large and complex problems of different nature
in an open-ended distributed environment, rising the level of abstraction to
have a coarse-grained view of the system.
More recent works clarify what a computational field is and how to use
it. In particular (Damiani et al. 2016) have presented i) a small universal
calculus of aggregate-level field calculus, ii) core fundamentals constructs and
concepts in order to develop sophisticated APIs, both general and domain-
specific, for programming distributed systems.
2.2 Abstractions 2. Aggregate Programming
Formally and briefly a field is a space-time structure defined as:
ϕ : D 7→ V
where:
• D is the events domain, and an event E is a triple ⟨δ, t, p⟩ formed by
a device δ “firing” at time t in position p
• V are the field values
See (Damiani et al. 2016) for a more formal and complete syntax.
2.2 Abstractions
It is possible to differentiate aggregate programming in five different layers:2
• Application code
• Developer APIs
• Resilient Coordination Operators
• Field Calculus Constructs
• Device Capabilities
Application code is where developers operate through user-friendly devel-
oper APIs. APIs encloses the sequence of instructions of resilient coordina-
tion operators and field calculus constructs.
A good starting point is the official repository (Pianini 2017) and a forked
version with many useful functions collected in a library, protelis-lang (Fran-
cia [Online; accessed: March 2017]). There are APIs that handle:
2Higher level of abstraction first
2. Aggregate Programming 9
• coordination, such as spreading, shared timer, timer replication, accu-
mulation, tree, graph and more,
• state, such as applying a function while a condition is true, cyclic timer,
invoking a function periodically, exponential back-off filter, holding
value until timeout and more,
• utilities, such as verifying if a device is on the edge, hood wrapping,
min, max and more.
One of the main advantages is the possibility to leave message passing be-
tween nodes behind the scene. Behavior results from these APIs and the
following coordination operators.
Resilient coordination operators (Beal & Viroli 2014):
• Gradient-cast: builds a distance-gradient from a source according to
a metric. It spreads information across space, potentially further orga-
nizing and computing as it proceeds. This operator is a generalization
that cove and build accumulated values on it. The G operator may
be thought of as executing two tasks i) computes of a field of shortest-
path distances from a source region and ii) computes an accumulation
of values along the gradient of the distance field away from the source.
• Converge-cast: collects information distributed across space by accu-
mulating values down the gradient3 of a potential field. Combining
with G it is possible to obtain a general “summary” operator that ag-
gregates the values of a region and then spreads it throughout space.
• Time-decay: summaries information throughout time by decaying ac-
cumulated values, i.e. it can be useful in monitoring actions for a given
time τ . 2].
3the unique vector field whose dot product with any vector v at each point x is the
directional derivative of a scalar function f along v
2.2 Abstractions 2. Aggregate Programming
• Sparse-choice: creates partitions and selects sparse subsets of nodes
in space. It breaks symmetry by exploiting a frequently used self-
organization principle, mutual inhibition. Devices compete against one
another to become local “leaders”. For example, it can be used to des-
ignate a representative device in a sensor network to act as a collection
point and relay to the consumers of the network’s sensor data.
Field calculus constructs are formed by:
• nbr (= neighborhood), typically application-specific, it is used to ob-
tain values from the nearest devices (i.e., physical proximity, wireless
connectivity..);
• rep (= repeat), time evolution, is a construct for dynamically changing
fields, that uses a model in which each device evaluates expressions
repeatedly in asynchronous rounds;
• if, domain restriction, is a space-time branching construct used for
example to spread different computation tasks in different regions of
the medium. In addition, as depicted in the Figure 2.2 below
Figure 2.2: If representation
Device capabilities, such as sensors and actuators that collect data from
the physical world and supply upper levels.
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Recap:
Function Space Time
Structure nbr rep
Aggregation C T
Spreading G T
Symmetry breaking S random
Restriction if if
Higher levels can express:
• Complex spreading, aggregation, decay functions.
• Spatial leader election, partitioning, consensus.
• Distributed spatio-temporal sensing and situation recognition.
• Dynamic spreading - eg: code deployment.
• Implicit/explicit device selection of what the code is executed by.
• Creation of sub-groups or collective teams based on the selected code.
2.3 Properties
Each aggregate programming system must have also core properties such
as safety and resilience, guaranteed as much as possible by coordination
operators.
(Lamport 1977) has defined safety as a property that - states that something
will not happen. The basic method of proving safety is to prove consistent
behavior of functionalities. (Lamport 1977) also explains a simple formaliza-
tion of proving safety as:
2.3 Properties 2. Aggregate Programming
If F : S → S is multivalued function and D ⊂ S and F (D) ⊂
D =⇒ F n(D) ⊂ D ∀n > 0 where F n is the composition of
F with itself n times and F takes the current program state into
its next state.
Safety is a characteristic of systems and not of their components. The state
of safety in any system is always dynamic.
The property of resilience is the ability to adapt and self-organize after
changing conditions, such as node failures, node mobility or evolution of
the network topology. As (Tanenbaum & Van Steen 2007) said, resilience
incorporates techniques by which one or more processes can fail without seri-
ously disturbing the rest of the system. Changing the word “processes” with
“devices” makes the definition valid for aggregate programming or more gen-
erally for all distributed systems.
Self-organization is the spontaneous often seemingly purposeful formation
of spatial, temporal, spatio-temporal structures or functions in systems com-
posed of few or many components. The concept of self-organization was
discussed by (Ashby 1947) and by (Foerster von H 1987) within his “Cyber-
netics of second order”. It was also discussed in thermodynamics (Nicolis
et al. 1977) and (Heylighen & others 2001). A systematic study of self-
organization phenomena is performed in the interdisciplinary field of syner-
getics (Haken 1977) that is concerned with a profound mathematical basis
of self-organization as well as with experimental studies of these phenomena.
The “Complexity” (Bar-Yam 1997) field is, at least partly, also concerned
with self-organization.
Chapter 3
Misbehavior and attacks
“We cannot choose our external circumstances, but we can always
choose how we respond to them” - Epictetus
This chapter starts with the inspection of the meaning of misbehaviour and
how it can occur. Next paragraphs are about attacks’ taxonomy and defini-
tions. In particular, attacks that are only strictly related with distributed
systems and aggregate computing. It is not intended to be a fully observa-
tion of all attacks patterns but just an overview of plausible strategies used
with malevolent intent.
3.1 Misbehaviours
A distributed system is constructed from a set of relatively inde-
pendent components that form a unified, but geographically and
functionally diverse entity. Nevertheless, distributed systems re-
main difficult to design, build, and maintain. - Rob Pike, Dennis
M. Ritchie
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3.1 Misbehaviours 3. Misbehavior and attacks
In a distributed system each independent component can obviously leave the
system or fault and stop working.
Misbehavior is a generic term to say that something does not operate as it
should. Node misbehaviour can occur:
• by i) intentionally (malevolent) or ii) accidentally performing an action
that is not allowed.
• by failing to perform an action due to lack of data and/or resources or
hardware faults.
This research takes a look only to misbehaviours that does not affect not
faulty nodes, directly or indirectly. Note that nodes are able to communicate
with each other only through message passing, the only medium disposable.
During message passing there are three ways in which nodes can influence
one another:
• by not receiving a message.
• by receiving a malformed message.
• by receiving a well formed message but with bad data.
The last two are slightly different; the first one is about the structure and
the syntax of the message, whereas the latter is about the semantics, the
meaning of the message.
Common distributed system properties (Gray 1986), such as availability,
reliability and fault-tolerance are already taken into account by aggregate
programming. Unfortunately these properties do not often take into account
problems that occurs with intentionally produced misbehaviours.
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3.2 Attacks
Misbehavior, as seen in the previous section is a generic term. It is possible
to differentiate a much broader range of intentional misbehaviours, com-
monly called attacks. Attacks can leverage fundamental system properties,
come up with really smart ideas and be really unpredictable. In this sec-
tion an overview and a taxonomy of plausible attacks in a typical WSN and
aggregate programming scenario is presented.
Each time an attack is described, it is important to keep in mind which is
the purpose and who is the target. From a security perspective it is a good
practice to think about the knowledge required and what is the amount of
time and/or resources needed by an attacker to accomplish his malevolent
intents.
An attack can be done by a single or a group.
3.2.1 From a single entity
Single malevolent entities attacks are:
• Corruption, altering data randomly or forged.
• Selective misbehaving, exchange valuable and good information to
someone and erroneous or bad to others.
• On-off, an entity may behave badly and well alternatively.
3.2.2 From multiple cooperating entities
In addition to the single and isolated malevolent entity, there could be co-
operating ones. Attack efficiency is obviously greater and the system can
3.2 Attacks 3. Misbehavior and attacks
be drastically negatively affected. In literature, cooperating attacks are also
called collusions, and they are:
• Driving down: malevolent entities outnumber the good one, dictating
the system.
• Malicious collectives with camouflage: malevolent groups collectively
send positive information about a malicious agent. This attack is also
called ballot stuffing and it is well-represented by (Mármol & Pérez
2009).
• Malicious spies: a subtle malevolent collectives with comouflage where
entities behave always correctly in order to gain trust from good peers
and from this “status quo” they give positive feedback to other malev-
olent entities in the network.
3.2.3 Attacks properties
The previously mentioned attacks’ taxonomies, were created accordingly to
the following properties:
• Attack intent: An enemy may have several different goals when try-
ing to subvert a system.
• Targets: Security threats can focus their efforts on a subset of entities
belonging to the system, on (non-)specific individual targets.
• Required knowledge : The amount of information that has to be
gathered or collected from the system in order to effectively perform
an attack Thus, some threats will require a comprehensive knowledge
about the whole system or about some particular entities, while some
other threats will work properly with a small knowledge.
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• Cost: The less expensive an attack is, the more beneficial is its appli-
cation. The cost of running an attack is not necessarily pecuniary, but
it can be also measured in terms of resources or time.
• Algorithm dependence: Some security threats take advantage of
a specific algorithm or of the model vulnerability and exploits it in
order to create a great damage to the system. Other attacks are more
generic and, consequently, applicable in a wider set of scenarios or
environments.
• Detectability: The later an attack is detected, the greater might be
the damage. That is the reason why most of the threats try not to
induce suspicion as much as possible, i.e., they do not cause drastic
changes in the system, but they rather make slight ones. In some way,
the ability to detect an attack or threat is an evaluation of its resilience
and effectiveness. If the collaboration between attackers increases, as
well as their gathered knowledge about the system, it is more difficult
to detect or prevent them.
3.3 Possible mitigations
In order to catch the aforementioned misbehaviours and attacks, a refac-
toring of entities/nodes behavior’ is needed within the standard framework
used. Some reasonable mitigations could be:
• Injecting memories in each node concerning previous received data in
order to detect not common messages. Unsupervised learning mecha-
nism can be used.
• Adding filters that drop not conformed messages.
• Using a trust system and reputation model, so that a message from an
un-trusted or unknown entity could be dropped or used with caution.
3.3 Possible mitigations 3. Misbehavior and attacks
Chapter 4
Trust Systems
Trust research range over different domains and topics such as sociology,
economics, philosophy, psychology, organizational management, autonomic
computing, communications and networking (Cho et al. 2011). It is a real
multidisciplinary concept with a term not yet completely formalized. Accord-
ing to Cambridge Dictionary (Dictionary [Online; accessed: March 2017]),
trust is defined as “to believe that someone is good and honest and will not
harm you, or that something is safe and reliable”.
Trust can be perceived as someone/something’s reliability or as a willing
dependence, decision.
4.1 Background
Trust is a one-directional relationship between two peers that can be called
trustor and trustee. The trustor is the entity that has the ability to make
assessments and decisions based on the information received and on its past
experience with the trustee.
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4.1 Background 4. Trust Systems
Trust can be differentiated into two macro areas i) IT security and ii)
soft-security (Jøsang 2007). The latter deals with human interactions and
it relates to psychological factors. For this reason it is not considered in this
study, which aims at pragmatic and practical approaches.
Reputation is often related to trust but these two concepts differ. The for-
mer is a collective feedback-delivered quantity which is shared by the whole
community, The latter is a personal and subjective opinion that can be seen
as a score based only on direct experience.
A trust metric must has the following characteristics (Cho et al. 2011):
• It should be established referring to potential risks.
• It should be context-dependent.
• It should be based on its own interest.
• It should be easily adaptable, dynamic and constantly updating.
• It should mirror the system reliability.
The term trust and trustworthiness have different meanings. Trust is a
belief and trustworthiness is the actual probability that varies from zero
(distrusted) to one (trusted). The perceived or estimated trustworthiness
of a potential cooperation partner is the basis for the trustor’s decision to
whether or not to cooperate. Figure 4.1 shows some important relationships.
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Figure 4.1: Trust levels: The horizontal axis is the subjective probability, i.e. the level of trust,
whereas the vertical axis is the objective probability, i.e. the level of trustworthiness. The t
on the horizontal axis marks the trust threshold, so there is trust whenever the subjective
probability is greater than t.
A crucial observation now is that a trust level ≥ t (resp. ≤ d) is not enough
for engaging in cooperation (Solhaug et al. 2007).
Obviously, trust per se is related with risk calculation and the aforementioned
probabilities are important metrics to cope with (Jøsang & Presti 2004).
(Solhaug et al. 2007) conclude that trust is generally neither proportional
nor inversely proportional to risk.
There are a multitude of applications of trust system such as EigenTrust (see
Section 4.2.1), PeerTrust (see Section 4.2.2), BTRM-WSN and PowerTrust.
Most of them are surveyed by (Mármol & Pérez 2009) with a notable de-
scription and worth comparison.
4.2 Trust Systems overview 4. Trust Systems
(Mármol & Pérez 2009) try to enumerate the fundamental steps needed in a
typical trust system as follows:
1. Collecting information.
2. Aggregating all the received information properly and somehow com-
puting a score for every peer in the network.
3. Selecting the most trustworthy messages and assessing a posteriori the
satisfaction updating the score.
4. (Optional) A last step, “punishing1 or rewarding” can be carried out,
adjusting consequently the global trust (or reputation).
Once misbehaving nodes are detected, their neighbors can use trust informa-
tion to avoid cooperation with them as if they are an obstacle.
4.2 Trust Systems overview
It is worth to mention at least two of the main trust algorithms before
proposing a solution. In the following sections a brief summary of two trust
algorithms - i) EigenTrust and ii) PeerTrust - follows:
4.2.1 EigenTrust
EigenTrust Algorithm (Kamvar et al. 2003) was proposed in 2003. The
algorithm has been incrementally developed with additional features in each
1Bucchegger and Le Boudec think that liars, node that report inaccurate testimonials,
should not be shamed or punished. The reason is that punishing these messages discourage
honest reporting of observed misbehavior. Since there are always at some point a node
that is bound to be the first witness of another node that misbehave, thus starting to
deviate from public opinion could be punished wrongly.
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revision. The basic EigenTrust algorithm has a simple centralized reputa-
tion calculation strategy, while the advances include distributed, transitive
and secured strategies for global calculations. An overview of the distributed
strategy of the algorithm follows. (Kamvar et al. 2003) have a deeper de-
scription.
The next example can be easily adapted to other contexts such as aggregate
programming devices or nodes.
Consider a P2P system consisting of n peers. Each time peer i exchanges
information with peer j, it rates the communication as sat(i, j) if positive,
and unsat(i, j) if negative, and keeps a record for the number of each. Then
the trust value sij is defined as:
sij = sat(i, j) − unsat(i, j) (4.1)
In order to aggregate local trust values, it is necessary to normalize them in
some manner. Otherwise, malevolent peers can assign arbitrarily high local
trust values to other malevolent peers, and arbitrarily low local trust values
to good peers, subverting the system easily. The trust value sij is normalized
as follows:
cij =
max(sij, 0)∑
j max(sij, 0)
(4.2)
Normalized local trust value ⟨cij⟩ ensure that all values will be between 0
and 1.
Usually, there are some peers that are known to be trustworthy in any P2P
system, so they are identified at an early stage of the system life as a set of
pre-trusted peers, P . This is especially important for inactive peers or those
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who recently joined the system, as they do not trust any peer. Thus, the
trust value is redefined as:
cij =

max(sij ,0)∑
j
max(sij ,0)
if ∑j max(sij, 0) ̸= 0
pi otherwise
(4.3)
where
pi =

1
|p| if i ∈ P
0 otherwise
(4.4)
Peer i’s global reputation is given by the local trust values given to it by
other peers, weighted by the global reputation of the assigning peers. Let C
be the matrix [cij] and −→ci a vector defined as follows:
C =

c1,1 c1,2 · · · c1,j · · · c1,m
c2,1 c2,2 · · · c2,j · · · c2,m
... ... . . . ... . . . ...
ci,1 ci,2 · · · ci,j · · · ci,m
... ... . . . ... . . . ...
cm,1 cm,2 · · · cm,j · · · cm,m

, −→ci =

ci,1
ci,1
...
ci,j
...
ci,m

(4.5)
Having this, tik represents the trust that peer i places in peer k based on
asking his friends, and defined as:
tik =
∑
j
cijcjk (4.6)
In matrix notation, −→ti is the vector containing the values tik.
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−→
ti = CT −→ci =
(
n∑
j=1
cijcj1, . . . ,
n∑
j=1
cijcjk, . . . ,
n∑
j=1
cijcjm
)
(4.7)
By querying his friends’ friends, peer i gets a wider view of peer’s k reputa-
tion, that is:
−→
ti = (CT )2−→ci (4.8)
Going on in this way, after a large enough number m of queries, peer i will
get the same eigenvector −→ti = (CT )m−→ci , as every other peer in the system.
Additionally, authors propose more sophisticated ways of computing this
eigenvector based on pre-trusted peers.
(Kamvar et al. 2003) consider that a peer who is honest providing something
is also likely to be honest in reporting its local trust values, which is not
necessarily always true.
There is also a distributed version where all peers in the network cooperate
to compute and store the global trust vector in order to reduce computation,
storage and message overhead for each peer.
4.2.2 PeerTrust
PeerTrust (Xiong & Liu 2004) is a trust and reputation model that combines
several important aspects related to the management of trust and reputation
in distributed systems, such as:
• The feedback a peer receives from other peers
• The total number of transactions of a peer
• The credibility of the recommendations given by a peer
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• The transaction context factor
• The community context factor
This accurate aggregation is performed through the following expression,
representing the trust value of peer u:
T (u) = α
I(u)∑
i=1
S(u, i)CR(p(u, i))TF (u, i) + β × CF (u) (1)
where
• I(u) denotes the total number of transactions performed by peer u
with all other peers;
• p(u, i) denotes the other participating peer in peer uith’s transaction;
• S(u, i) denotes the normalized amount of satisfaction peer u receives
from p(u, i) in its iith transaction;
• CR(v) denotes the credibility of the feedback submitted by v;
• TF (u, i) denotes the context factor of the adaptive transaction for
peer uith’s transaction;
• and CF (u) denotes the context factor of the adaptive community for
peer u.
On the other hand, the credibility of v from w’s point of view, is computed
as:
Cr(p(u, i)) = Sim(p(u, i), w)∑I(u)Sim(p(u,j),w)
j=1
(2)
where
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Sim(v, w) = 1−
√√√√√√ ∑
x∈IJS(v,w)
∑I(x,v)i=1 S(x, i)
I(x, v)
−
∑I(x,w)
i=1 S(x, i)
I(x, w)
2/|IJS(v, w)|
(3)
and respectively:
• I(u, v) denotes the total number of transactions performed by peer u
with peer v;
• IS(v) denotes the set of peers that have interacted with peer v;
• IJS(v, w) denotes the common set of peers that have interacted with
both peer v and w, computed as IS(v) ∩ IS(w).
Additionally this model introduces a trust-based peer selection scheme.
A simple rule for peer w to decide whether to have an interaction with peer
u or not could be T (u) > Tthreshold(w), where the value of Tthreshold(w)
depends on several factors such as the importance of the transaction, or the
disposition of w to trust unknown peers or not, among many others.
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Chapter 5
Experiments
The road to learning by precept is long, but by example short and
effective. Lucius Annaeus Seneca
This chapter adds together the knowledge gathered from the previous chap-
ters and tries to to find out how to develop solutions by following the scien-
tific method. Solutions tackle some security issues in a common aggregate
programming algorithm: the gradient.
A gradient field is often associated with the function distance-to. Function
distance-to takes as its input a source field and returns a new field that
maps each node to the estimated distance from the nearest source device.
A source is a field holding specific values that differentiate it from other
fields. Similarly in these experiments malevolent nodes have a value that
differentiates them from possible other sources and devices.
It is important to be aware that in real scenarios malevolent nodes could use
fake identities. It is not possible to identify good peers from bad ones be-
fore adding an authentication algorithm. Proposed solutions must somehow
differentiate and identify “fake” nodes. Nevertheless, algorithms’ mentioned
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before checks and filters which values each peer sends to his neighbours.
The scenario tested is on a grid-like network in which malevolent nodes send
erroneous values such as:
1. Camouflage as a real source:
• with a different distance from the real one;
• with an incremental number of nodes in it;
• in groups/crowds.
2. Send corrupted values to their neighbours.
The first sections start with a brief overview of the used languages:
• Protelis Language (Par. 5.1)
• Scala (Par. 5.3)
and technologies:
• Alchemist Simulator (Par. 5.2)
• scafi (Par. 5.3)
• SciPy (Par. 5.4)
The next following sections are about the experiments and simulations, in
which malevolent area change:
• distance from source (Par. 5.5.1)
• size (Par. 5.5.2)
• number of (Par. 5.5.3)
• sent values (Par. 5.5.4)
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The last sections are about solutions (Par. 5.6):
• Solution one: External Trust System (Par. 5.6.1)
• Proposed Solution two: Filter Functions (Par. 5.6.2)
• Proposed Solution three: Local Trust system (Par. 5.6.3)
5.1 Protelis Language
The goal of the Protelis language is to make resilient networked systems easy
to build for complex and heterogeneous networks as for single machines and
cloud systems. This is accomplished by separating the different tasks and
making some of the hard and subtle parts automatic and implicit. A few of
the key design decisions behind Protelis are:
• It is a language because there are a lot of subtle and easy ways to break
a distributed system. Creating a language, rather than just a library,
lets complexity be handled implicitly, so there is no opportunity to
make mistakes.
• It is hosted in and integrated with Java, an advantage thanks to its
large pre-existing ecosystem and libraries.
• It looks as much practical as Java in order to make it easier to learn
and adopt.
• It ensures safe and resilient composition because its core is field calcu-
lus, the theoretical model discussed in 2.1.
Protelis emerged from the synthesis of several prior projects:
• Proto, an aggregate programming language created by Jacob Beal and
Jonathan Bachrach.
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• Field calculus, a distillation of aggregate programming models by
Mirko Viroli, Ferruccio Damiani, and Jacob Beal
• The Alchemist Simulator project, led by Danilo Pianini and Mirko
Viroli.
5.2 Getting a visual representation: Alchemist
Alchemist is an extensible “meta-simulator”, inspired by stochastic chem-
istry (i.e. kinetic Monte Carlo) and tailored to pervasive computing and
distributed systems. It provides a flexible meta-model, on which developers
should bind their own abstractions. An abstraction is also called incarnation
or extension. In this research the Protelis language1 incarnation is used in
order to use field calculus constructs.
Alchemist is available on Maven Central. It is possible to import all the
components using the it.unibo.alchemist:alchemist groovy artifact. If
you do not need the whole Alchemist machinery but just a sub-part of it,
you can restrict the set of imported artifacts by using as dependencies the
modules you are actually in need of.
Using Gradle build system2 it is only required to specify in the Groovy3
script named build.gradle which alchemist version to use:
compile ’it.unibo.alchemist:alchemist:ALCHEMIST_VERSION’
Groovy is an optionally typed and dynamic language, with static-typing and
1protelis.github.io ([Online; accessed: March 2017])
2gradle.org ([Online; accessed: March 2017])
3www.groovy-lang.org ([Online; accessed: March 2017])
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static compilation capabilities. An example of build script is structured as
follows:
1
2 dependencies {
3 compile ( ”it.unibo.alchemist:alchemist:$alchemistVersion” )
4 }
5
6 task runAlchemist(type: JavaExec) {
7 classpath = sourceSets.main.runtimeClasspath
8 classpath ”src/main/protelis”
9 classpath ”src/main/java”
10 maxHeapSize = ”8g”
11 main = ”it.unibo.alchemist.Alchemist”
12 args(
13 ”-y”, ”src/main/yaml/${simulation}.yml”,
14 ”-g”, ”src/main/effects/${simulation}.aes”,
15 ”-t”, ”500”,
16 ”-e”, ”data/exportedData”
17 )
18 dependsOn(compileJava)
19 }
20
21 defaultTasks(”runAlchemist”)
22
It is possible to get ready for the first simulation using the Protelis incarna-
tion only by cloning and running Protelis-Sandox repository (Francia [Online;
accessed: March 2017]).
This work has used Alchemist only to have a visual representation of how
an attack scenario looks like. Simulations have been done using scafi, as
sections below will further inspect. Alchemist network topology and scafi
match.
Experiment sources can be found at GitHub (github.com/jak3/
Protelis-Sandbox [Online; accessed: March 2017]).
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5.3 Data extraction and simulations: scafi
scafi is an aggregate programming framework for Scala. It provides:
1. a Scala-internal DSL for expressing aggregate computations and field
calculus semantics in a correct and complete way;
2. a distributed platform developed over the Actor Model of Akka toolkit4,
supporting the configuration and execution of aggregate systems;
3. flexible API.
Scala is a general-purpose programming language with the following main
characteristics:
• it runs on the JVM and integrates with the Java ecosystem seamlessly;
• it is a pure OOP: every value is an object and every operation is a
method call;
• unlike Java, Scala has many features of functional programming lan-
guages that integrate smoothly with the object-oriented paradigm;
• has an advanced type system supporting algebraic data types, covari-
ance and contravariance, higher-order types, and anonymous types;
• is designed to be a “scalable” language, by keeping things simple while
complexity grows;
• has a powerful and expressive static type system with type inference.
scafi provides a reasonably fast Virtual Machine for the scafi DSL and it
comes with a basic simulator that allows execution of aggregate algorithms
locally. In this research it is used to simulate attacks scenarios and data
extraction for statistic purpose and plotting.
4akka.io ([Online; accessed: March 2017])
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5.4 Plotting: matplotlib
Plotting has been done using matplotlib from SciPy. SciPy is a Python-based
ecosystem of open-source software for mathematics, science, and engineering.
In particular, these are some of the core packages:
• NumPy: Base N-dimensional array package.
• SciPy: Fundamental library for scientific computing.
• Matplotlib: Comprehensive 2D Plotting.
• IPython: Enhanced Interactive Console.
• Sympy: Symbolic mathematics.
• pandas: Data structures & analysis.
To get a glimpse of its simplicity, the source code used to plot error functions
follow:
1
2 def plotError(metadata, errors):
3 plt.grid(True)
4 plt.title(metadata[’title’])
5 plt.xlabel(metadata[’lx’])
6 plt.ylabel(metadata[’ly’])
7 plt.margins(x=0.04, y=0.04)
8 plt.tight_layout()
9 plt.xticks(metadata[’x’])
10
11 x = metadata[’x’]
12 z = np.polyfit(x, errors, 3)
13 f = np.poly1d(z)
14 # Return evenly spaced numbers over a specified interval
15 x_new = np.linspace(x[0], x[-1], 100)
16 y_new = f(x_new)
17 plt.plot(x, errors, ’--or’, x_new, y_new)
18
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5.5 Simulations
As previously mentioned, the different types of malevolent behaviour that
are considered are:
1. Fake source at different distance from the real one (Section 5.5.1).
2. Fake source of different size (also referred as magnitude) (Section
5.5.2).
3. Number of fake sources (Section 5.5.3).
4. Degree of maliciousness of the fake source: using lower values in a
gradient algorithm has a greater impact on the system (Section 5.5.4).
Each section has:
• a visual representation that helps to grasp the scenario, thanks to
Alchemist;
• a snipped scala code used to run the simulation and export data;
• a plot, useful as a recap and forecast of other similar scenarios.
Error function is calculated as follows:
ϵ = |µhealthy − µmisbehaviour|
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5.5.1 Distance
Alchemist Screenshots
Figure 5.a
In (Figure 5.a)5 the first image from left shows an healthy gradient in which
source field is at the center of the red area. Subsequently a malevolent field
was added and nodes were highlighted with white. From left to right, it is
possible to see the damage that a fake source produces at different distances.
The more each simulated gradient colors differ from the first picture, the
greater the network was influenced.
scafi code snippet
1
2 object DemoSecurity extends AggregateProgram with MyLib {
3
4 def isSource = sense[Boolean](”source”)
5 def isFake = sense[Boolean](”fake”)
6
7 def gradient(source: Boolean)(expr:Double): Double = {
8 rep(Double.MaxValue) {
9 distance =>
10 mux(isFake) { expr }
11 { mux(isSource) { 0.0 } {
12 minHood {
13 nbr { distance } + nbrRange()
14 }
15 }
16 }
17 }
5All images are captured after the gradient was stabilized.
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18 }
19
20 def main = gradient(isSource){ 0.0 }
21 }
22
23 object DemoSequenceLauncher extends App {
24 for (a <- 0 to 15) {
25 val net = simulatorFactory.gridLike(n = 15, m = 15,
26 stepx = 1, stepy = 1,
27 eps = 0.0, rng = 1.1)
28
29 net.addSensor(name = ”source”, value = false)
30 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”source”,ids = Set(3),value=true)
31
32 net.addSensor(name = ”fake”, value = false)
33 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”fake”,ids = Set(a),value = true)
34
35 net.executeMany(node = DemoSecurity, size = 10000,
36 (n,i) => {})
37 }
38 }
Chunk of an output file:
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0
2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0
4.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0
5.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0
6.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0
7.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0
8.0 9.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0
It is also possible to use just Alchemist instead of using both. Source code
to simulate a fake source at a different distance from the real one can be
done with the following Protelis file:
1
2 module distance
3
4 let res = rep (d <- 100) {
5 mux(env.has(”fake”)) { 0 } else{
6 mux (env.has(”source”)) { 0 } else {
7 minHood(nbr(d) + self.nbrRange())
8 }}};
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9 env.put(”distanceTo”, res);
10 res
11
and Yaml configuration:
1
2 incarnation: protelis
3
4 network-model:
5 type: EuclideanDistance
6 parameters: [0.5]
7
8 pools:
9 - pool: &distance
10 - time-distribution: 1
11 program: distance
12 - time-distribution: null
13 program: send
14
15 displacements:
16 - in:
17 type: Grid
18 parameters: [-10, -10, 10, 10, 0.25, 0.25, 0.1, 0.1]
19 contents:
20 - in:
21 type: Rectangle
22 parameters: [5, 5, 5, 5]
23 molecule: viri
24 concentration: ”Fake”
25 - in:
26 type: Rectangle
27 parameters: [-2, -2, 2, 2]
28 molecule: source
29 concentration: true
30 programs:
31 - *distance
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Figure 5.1
At a first look, it is possible to think that the more the fake source is near
to the real one the greater the damage will be. However Figure 5.1 proves
otherwise. It is rational because, in a gradient based on a distance-to algo-
rithm, malevolent nodes near a source have values with a lower δ. Far away
from the source, nodes have a high internal value and they are clearly more
influenced by a neighbor that sends 0.0 as distance value. Error increases
with an exponential growth until the fake source exits the gradient.
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5.5.2 Magnitude
Alchemist Screenshots
Figure 5.b
A healthy gradient can be seen in the previous section (Section 5.5.1). Malev-
olent nodes are represented in white6, firstly fewer than the real ones and
gradually more.
scafi code snipped
1
2 object DemoSecurity extends AggregateProgram with MyLib {
3
4 def isSource = sense[Boolean](”source”)
5 def isFake = sense[Boolean](”fake”)
6
7 def radius(x: Double, r: Int): Double = {
8 if (x < r) return 0
9 else return x
10 }
11
12 def gradient(source: Boolean)(expr:Double): Double = {
13 rep(Double.MaxValue) {
14 distance =>
15 mux(isFake) { expr }
16 { mux(isSource) { 0.0 } {
17 minHood {
18 nbr { distance } + nbrRange() }
19 }
20 }
21 }
22 }
23 def main = gradient(isSource){
6All images are captured after the gradient was stabilized.
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24 G[Double](isSource, 0,
25 (x: Double) => radius(x, 2), 1)
26 }
27
28 }
29
30 object DemoSequenceLauncher extends App {
31
32 def Magnitude() {
33 val boss = 25*5+15
34
35 def getBad(c: Int, r:Int, size: Int): Set[Int] = {
36 var init = Set[Int]()
37 for(i <- 0 to r) {
38 for (k <- 0 to r) {
39 init += c + (size * i + k)
40 }
41 }
42 return init
43 }
44
45 val badguys = Array(Set(boss), getBad(boss-26, 2, 25),
46 getBad(boss-(26*2), 3, 25),
47 getBad(boss-(26*3), 4, 25))
48
49 for(magnitude <- 0 to 8){
50 val net = simulatorFactory.gridLike(n = 15, m = 15,
51 stepx = 1, stepy = 1,
52 eps = 0.0, rng = 1.1)
53
54 net.addSensor(name = ”source”, value = false)
55 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”source”, ids = Set(25*3+5),
56 value = true)
57 net.addSensor(name = ”fake”, value = false)
58 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”fake”,
59 ids = getBad(boss-26,magnitude, 25),
60 value = true)
61 net.executeMany(node = DemoSecurity, size = 100000,
62 (n,i) => {})
63 }
64 }
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Figure 5.2
Intuitively the greater the malevolent area size is, the more the system is
influenced by it.
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5.5.3 Crowds
Alchemist Screenshots
Figure 5.c
Crowds of malevolent areas surround the real source, starting from two fake
independent zones7 to end with six.
scafi code snipped
1
2 object DemoSecurity extends AggregateProgram with MyLib {
3
4 def isSource = sense[Boolean](”source”)
5 def isFake = sense[Boolean](”fake”)
6
7 def gradient(source: Boolean)(expr:Double): Double = {
8 rep(Double.MaxValue) {
9 distance =>
10 mux(isFake) { expr }
11 { mux(isSource) { 0.0 } {
12 minHood {
13 nbr { distance } + nbrRange()
14 }
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 }
19
20 def main = gradient(isSource){ 0.0 }
21
22 }
23
24 object DemoSequenceLauncher extends App {
25 def Crowd() {
7All images are captured after the gradient was stabilized.
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26 val init = 25*25/2
27 val pos = Set(init+10, init-10, init-25*3,
28 init+25*3, init-20*3, init+20*3)
29
30 for(b <- 1 to 7){
31 val net = simulatorFactory.gridLike(n = 15, m = 15,
32 stepx = 1, stepy = 1,
33 eps = 0.0, rng = 1.1)
34
35 net.addSensor(name = ”source”, value = false)
36 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”source”, ids = Set(init),
37 value = true)
38 net.addSensor(name = ”fake”, value = false)
39 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”fake”, ids = pos.take(b),
40 value = true)
41 net.executeMany(node = DemoSecurity, size = 100000,
42 (n,i) => {})
43 }
44 }
45
Simulations results
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Figure 5.3
As in the experiments done before with a malevolent area of different size,
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increasing the amount of fake sources leads to a much broader impact in the
error ratio.
5.5.4 Badness
Alchemist Screenshots
Figure 5.d
From left to right, malevolent nodes send the following corrupted negative
values that are
(
− 1, −5, −15, −25, −100
)
.
The first and the second snapshots are captured after the gradient was sta-
bilized while the following, during infection propagation instead. All nodes,
in a δ-time proportional to the negative value, will be red. Obviously a neg-
ative value has a deleterious effect on a distance-to algorithm. However,
negative values are easily detectable. An algorithm like distance-to where
distance between a point A and a point B can’t be negative, a simple filter
that drops those values solves the problem.
1
2 object DemoSecurity extends AggregateProgram with MyLib {
3
4 def isSource = sense[Boolean](”source”)
5 def isFake = sense[Boolean](”fake”)
6
7 def badness():Double = sense[Double](”badness”)
8 def gradient(source: Boolean)(expr:Double): Double = {
9 rep(Double.MaxValue) {
10 distance =>
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11 mux(isFake) { expr }
12 { mux(isSource) { 0.0 } {
13 minHood {
14 nbr { distance } + nbrRange()
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 }
19 }
20
21 def main = gradient(isSource, badness())
22 }
23
24 object DemoSequenceLauncher extends App {
25 def Badness() {
26 val boss = 25*5+15
27 val badness = Array(1.0,5.0,15.0,25.0,100.0)
28
29 for(b <- badness){
30 val net = simulatorFactory.gridLike(n = 15, m = 15,
31 stepx = 1, stepy = 1,
32 eps = 0.0, rng = 1.1)
33 net.addSensor(name = ”source”, value = false)
34 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”source”, ids = Set(25*3+5),
35 value = true)
36 net.addSensor(name = ”fake”, value = false)
37 net.chgSensorValue(name = ”fake”, ids = Set(boss),
38 value = true)
39 net.addSensor(name = ”badness”, value = -b)
40
41 net.executeMany(node = DemoSecurity, size = 100000,
42 (n,i) => {})
43 }
44 }
5.6 Proposed solutions 5. Experiments
Simulations results
1 5 15 25 100
|value|
20
40
60
80
100
E
rr
o
r 
(ε
)
Different Negatives Corrupted Values
Figure 5.4
Independently from the amount of the negative value, it could be both -10
or -100, this overwhelms other nodes distance value. In the Figure 5.4, the
error is proportional to the negative value due to the chose error function.
5.6 Proposed solutions
It is necessary to prevent errors so that each node is aware of data received.
Data can be malformed, unstructured or specifically crafted with the purpose
of crushing the system or worse, with harmful intentions. An evaluation
strategy is needed in order to judge these messages.
Data evaluation can be done in different ways by incorporating an inter-
nal trust system or with other precautions. Since aggregate programming
scenarios evolve in time, trust values need to be updated accordingly.
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Solutions proposed are:
1. The use an external trust system that monitors nodes behaviour
and that instructs each of them about peers that can be trusted or
not.
2. The use of an internal filter function based on specific security met-
rics. For example, in a distance-to algorithm it is possible to drop
negatives values and/or values that differ too much from other neigh-
bours. Using a threshold η could be useful.
3. The use of a local trust system. Each node memorizes a list of
untrusted peers that, that is updated accordingly to their behaviour.
Security policy and learning algorithms can be used to update the
untrusteds’ list and to adapt it to different scenarios.
5.6.1 Solution one: External Trust System
From an engineering perspective, by using an external trust system a devel-
oper does not need to know how it was developed. Implementation details
are decoupled as well as interfaces in OOP. Nodes receive trust fields from
the outside, without having to bother to evaluate and update such scores.
Values that come from untrusted nodes will be ignored/discarded.
In order to simulate this solution scenario, it is required to set
Double.PositiveInfinity to fake (malevolent) peers. It is important
to remember that this particular gradient is a distance-to function, so
distance is equal to the lower value from a neighbour.
Double.PositiveInfinity is the least significant value possible and corre-
spond to the furthest hypothetical value.
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1
2 def gradient(source: Boolean)(expr:Double): Double = {
3 rep(Double.MaxValue) {
4 distance =>
5 mux(isFake) { expr }
6 { mux(isSource) { 0.0 } {
7 minHood { nbr { distance } + nbrRange() }
8 }
9 }
10 }
11 }
12
13 def distanceToWithOracle(untrusted: Boolean): Double = {
14 gradient(isSource) { Double.PositiveInfinity }
15 }
16
Simulations Results
Improvements are notable in each of the previous experiments. In the fol-
lowing plots red dots represent error values obtained without the external
trust system and the green dots error values with it. Red and green curves
are both interpolations.
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5.6.2 Proposed Solution two: Filter Functions
Simulations Results
Remarkable results are feasible with few lines of code using a filter function,
builtin in every languages. This techniques alone ward off several security
threads. Even a single line of code can set error values to zero in the simu-
lation saw in section 5.5.4.
1
2 val nvs = field(nbr(mainb)).filter(_ < 0)
This solution preempt malevolent behaviour only by a developer deliberately
control. It is improbable to leave aside all possible threads but it deserve at-
tention, at least for the trade-off between spent developing time and results.
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5.6.3 Proposed Solution three: Local Trust System
Simulations Results
It is essential to consider that aggregate programming algorithms are reactive
to external changes and evolve in time. They dynamically update and each
node could move its position in space and change his behaviour. For this
reason, a local trust system must be adaptable to changes and be able to
recognize erroneous values (i.e. spikes) from good peers and to not increase
their trust score.
1
2 def distanceToWithLocalTrust()(expr: Double): Double = {
3
4 val threshold = 3 // varies between scenarios, can be trained
5
6 var nvs = getNeighboursField()
7 nvs = nvs.filterUntrusted()
8
9 // Evaluate mean value
10 var mn = mean(nvs.map(r => r._2))
11
12 // Filter new untrusted devices
13 val trusted = nvs.filter(isOutsideThreshold(_._2, threshold, mn))
14
15 // Evaluate new mean value
16 mn = mean(trusted)
17
18 rep( Double.MaxValue ){ _ =>
19 mux(isFake) { expr } { mux(isSource) { 0.0 } { mean } }
20 }
21 }
Chapter 6
Conclusion
“If we wait until we’re ready, we’ll be waiting for the rest of our
lives.” - Lemony Snicket, The Ersatz Elevator
Despite this thesis focuses only on a gradient algorithm, it is possible to
use the solutions aforementioned to deal with additional security thread in a
broader range of aggregate programming algorithms (Section 5.6.1, Section
5.6.2 and Section 5.6.3).
Following the path of these examples and using current technologies dis-
cussed above, it is possible to discuss, design and develop new security-aware
aggregate programming algorithms.
A noteworthy idea come up during a conversation and it is reported as a
roadmap in the following section.
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Further trust system implementations could exploit the function recentTrue:
1
2 def recentTrue(state: Boolean, memoryTime: Double): Boolean = {
3 rtSub(timer(10) == 0, state, memoryTime)
4 }
5
This function building block is the time-decay aggregate API, T, that sums
up information throughout time by decaying accumulated values.
1
2 def timer[V](length: V)
3 (implicit ev: Numeric[V]) =
4 T[V](length)
5
6 def limitedMemory[V,T](value: V, expValue: V, timeout: T)
7 (implicit ev: Numeric[T]) = {
8 val t = timer[T](timeout)
9 (if(ev.gt(t, ev.zero)) value else expValue, t)
10 }
11
12 def rtSub(start: Boolean, state: Boolean, memT: Double): Boolean = {
13 if(state) { true }
14 else {
15 limitedMemory[Boolean,Double](start, false, memT)._1
16 }
17 }
recentTrue let a developer know if a given device is True for at least δT time
unit. Mixing with proposed solutions (Section 5.6.1, Section 5.6.2, Section
5.6.3), a new version could take into account if a given device behaves badly
for a given δT time. If so, the device will be identified as malevolent and
banned from the system for a variable period of time.
Appendix 1: Dissertation
writing using Pandoc
This dissertation is almost written in Markdown1. The formal LaTeX2 rep-
resentation document was auto-genereted by Pandoc3.
6.2 About Pandoc
Pandoc is a universal markup document converter entirely written in
Haskell4. Pandoc can convert documents in markdown, reStructuredText,
textile, HTML, DocBook, LaTeX, MediaWiki markup, TWiki markup,
OPML, Emacs Org-Mode, Txt2Tags, Microsoft Word docx, LibreOffice
ODT, EPUB, or Haddock markup to
• HTML formats: XHTML, HTML5, and HTML slide shows using Slidy,
reveal.js, Slideous, S5, or DZSlides.
• Word processor formats: Microsoft Word docx, OpenOffice/LibreOffice
ODT, OpenDocument XML
• Ebooks: EPUB version 2 or 3, FictionBook2
• Documentation formats: DocBook, TEI Simple, GNU TexInfo, Groff
man pages, Haddock markup
1https://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown
2https://www.latex-project.org
3http://pandoc.org
4https://www.haskell.org
6.2 About Pandoc 6. Conclusion
• Page layout formats: InDesign ICML
• Outline formats: OPML
• TeX formats: LaTeX, ConTeXt, LaTeX Beamer slides
• PDF via LaTeX
• Lightweight markup formats: Markdown (including CommonMark),
reStructuredText, AsciiDoc, MediaWiki markup, DokuWiki markup,
Emacs Org-Mode, Textile Custom formats: custom writers can be
written in lua.
Pandoc understands a number of useful markdown syntax extensions, in-
cluding document metadata (title, author, date); footnotes; tables; defini-
tion lists; superscript and subscript; strikeout; enhanced ordered lists (start
number and numbering style are significant); running example lists; delim-
ited code blocks with syntax highlighting; smart quotes, dashes, and ellipses;
markdown inside HTML blocks; and inline LaTeX. If strict markdown com-
patibility is desired, all of these extensions can be turned off.
LaTeX math (and even macros) can be used in markdown documents. Sev-
eral different methods of rendering math in HTML are provided, including
MathJax and translation to MathML. LaTeX math is rendered in docx using
native Word equation objects.
Pandoc includes a powerful system for automatic citations and bibliogra-
phies, Many forms of bibliography database can be used, including bibtex,
RIS, EndNote, ISI, MEDLINE, MODS, and JSON citeproc. Citations work
in every output format.
Pandoc includes a Haskell library and a standalone command-line program.
The library includes separate modules for each input and output format, so
adding a new input or output format just requires adding a new module.
Pandoc is free software, released under the GPL by John MacFarlane.
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6.3 Motivations
Science uses writing since the early days to pass on knowledge to the new
generations. Internet and the World Wide Web have drastically aids the way
people communicate and share information.
English is adopted as a lingua franca in order to reach more readers.
It is essential, however, to reach also other types of readers, blind people.
Technologies such as screen readers help them to access digital information
but some data presentation formats are more accessible than others. The
widely used PDF format, for example, is really tricky to read. This is the real
motivation behind the use of a more accessible format such as Markdown or
HTML: being accessible as much as possible.
This is not a call to dismiss working with LaTeX and related generated
PDF documents. They have a really well structured format, awesome for
printing. This is a call to all academics to try to be aware as much as
possible of alternative solutions that help them in their vocation: spread
their knowledge to the world.
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